Context
Recently, China hosted the first-ever trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Bangladesh in Kunming, on the sidelines of the China-South Asia Exposition. It has profound effects on South Asia, especially for India. Here, we have discussed in detail China’s trilateral nexus against India.
Historical Foundations: Motivations Behind the Nexus
(i) 1962 War Legacy: The India-China War of 1962 set the foundation for the sustainable China-Pakistan alliance.
(a) For China, Pakistan acted as a strategic buffer to restrict India.
(b) Also, for Pakistan, China came out as a resolute economic and military patron.
(ii) Economic and Military Dependence: Pakistan has a debt of twenty-nine billion dollars to China (By the end of 2024)
(a) 80% of Pakistan’s arms imports originate from China.
(b) China persistently support Pakistan at the UN, particularly in matters of terrorism.
(iii) Bangladesh’s Emergence and Early Tensions: Bangladesh was formed out of Pakistan’s eastern territory in 1971. China supported Pakistan during the 1971 war, and recognised Bangladesh as a country only in 1976.
‘China-Pakistan Plus One’- Reemergence
(a) Historical Roots: Pakistan considered leveraging China, East Pakistan, as well as Nepal, to disrupt India’s access to its northeast via the Siliguri corridor as far back as 1965.
(b) Current Manifestations: Terror attacks in Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019), and Pahalgam (2025) have seen decisive Indian retaliation.
(c) India’s diplomatic offensives: Suspension of treaties, trade barriers and halts, and precise strikes have uncovered Pakistan’s vulnerabilities.
Implications for India
(i) Two-Front Strategic Pressure: China in the north and Pakistan in the west, Bangladesh’s increasing allegiance with them potentially opens a third angle of strategic concern on India’s eastern region. This tripartite could stretch India’s military and diplomatic bandwidth.
(ii) Encirclement Anxiety: The nexus strengthens the perception of a Chinese-led strategy to surround India, particularly by stretching BRI and substantial military cooperation in Bangladesh.
(iii) Vulnerability to Siliguri Corridor: Siliguri Corridor (aka ‘Chicken’s Neck’), connecting mainland India to its northeastern states, becomes way more vulnerable. Any unwanted and abnormal presence of Chinese or Pakistani stakeholders in Bangladesh could threaten this narrow and important corridor.
(iv) Operational Challenges: Pakistan’s step of using Chinese-made military hardware during recent escalations, and Bangladesh’s participation in Pakistani naval exercises (Aman-25), portend rising interoperability among the three militaries.
India’s Strategic Outreach
(a) The Maldives has changed its course and has come closer to India economically despite its president’s earlier anti-India stance.
(b) Nepal’s BRI projects with China are still in the dust due to financial issues.
(c) Sri Lanka’s new leadership has apparently shown allegiance with India’s red lines.
(d) India has not hindered any regional energy initiatives, in spite of bitter ties with Bangladesh.
India-Bangladesh Relations: Key Highlights and Challenges
Significance of the Bay of Bengal for India
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India’s Potential Approach
(i) Strategic and Military Posturing: Ensure robust border infrastructure in the Northeast, particularly around the Siliguri Corridor, to deter any encroachment.
(a) Increase maritime surveillance and naval deployments in the Bay of Bengal to deter Chinese influence in Bangladesh.
(b) Upgrade defence capabilities and enhance the frequency of joint military exercises (QUAD), military theaterisation, etc.
(ii) Diplomatic Engagement: Restore trust with Bangladesh through high-level military and diplomatic visits, economic incentives, and people-to-people relations.
(a) Strengthen ties with Afghanistan to restrict Pakistan’s advantageous position and counter Chinese outreach.
(b) Assert redlines diplomatically, making it clear that provocations will have economic and political consequences.
(iii) Economic Leverage: Enhance and expand the reach of regional trade and connectivity projects like the India-Bangladesh-Nepal energy corridor.
(a) Provide competitive alternatives to Chinese investments, specifically in infrastructure projects and digital connectivity.
(b) Use economic tools as weapons (e.g., trade restrictions, port access denial) selectively to portend disapproval without turning away neighbours.
(iv) Regional Coalition Building: Strengthen BIMSTEC and SAARC as platforms for regional cooperation, excluding China.
(a) Foster trilateral and multilateral dialogues with allied countries to weaken China’s influence.
(b) Give patronage to democratic institutions and civil society in neighbouring countries to check authoritarian ideas from spreading.
(v) Information and Cyber Strategy: Counter disinformation campaigns and propaganda purported to malign India’s regional and global image. Strengthen cybersecurity to safeguard critical infrastructure from potential threats coming from Chinese-backed tech.
(vi) Strategic Patience and Flexibility: Avoid instantaneous reactions to provocations; instead, give calculated responses to maintain the moral high ground. Adapt to dispensation changes in neighbouring countries with practical diplomacy instead of ideological similarities and rigidities.
Conclusion
India’s unwavering and balanced approach, comprising strategic partnerships, military readiness, economic initiatives, and diplomatic resolutions, is significantly crucial to safeguarding its national interests and maintaining regional stability.